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SWIFT v. TYSON OVERRULED
By ERIE A. KIGHTLINGER*
The mine run case involving simple questions of tort or
contract law may provide the vehicle for the expression of
far reaching judicial doctrine. Just such cases were Swift v.
Tyson,' and Erie Railroad v. Tomkins. 2 The question pre-
sented in Swift v. Tyson was whether the plaintiff who had
taken the negotiable instrument sued upon in satisfaction
of a pre-existing debt was a bona fide holder free of the
defenses which w6uld have been available as between the
original contracting parties. The action had been brought
in the Federal Court in New York upon the ground of di-
versity of citizenship. Since the tendency of the New York
decisions "deviated widely from the norm of judicial deci-
sion" Justice Story embarked upon his narrow construction
of the 34th Section of the Judiciary Act of 17893 and held
that the word "laws" therein only comprehended statutes
and did not extend to the decisions of the state tribunals.
Thus Swift recovered, the New York law holding that a pre-
existing debt was not sufficient consideration to constitute the
plaintiff a bona fide holder was disregarded, the prevailing
doctrine but not universal rule that a pre-existing debt was
such a valuable consideration as to convey title to the instru-
ment "to a bona fide holder against all antecedent parties
to a negotiable note" was followed, and the doctrine that
as to matters of general jurisprudence, not touched upon by
the statutes of the states, the Federal Courts were free to
Of the Indianapolis Bar.
1 16 Pet. (41 U. S.) 1 (1842).
2 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins (U. S. 1938), 58 S. Ct. 817.
3 "The laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties,
or statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in trials at common law, in the Courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply." (28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 725.)
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establish their own rules was sent upon its way to be severely
criticised but followed for nearly one hundred years.
In Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, the plaintiff was a Pennsyl-
vania citizen who sued the Erie, a New York corporation,
in Federal Court for an injury which he claimed occurred
when he was struck by something which looked like a door
projecting from one of the moving cars as he walked at
night along a path of the Railroad's right of way. The Erie
contended that the law of Pennsylvania, the locus delicti,
did not impose liability upon the railroad for negligence to
trespassers. The plaintiff denied that such was the Pennsyl-
vania law and in the alternative contended that since there
was no statute of Pennsylvania on the subject the railroad's
duty and liability was to be determined in the federal courts
as a matter of general law. The trial court agreed with
the plaintiff's contention and followed what it considered to
be the generally recognized law that a jury may find that
negligence exists .toward a pedestrian using a permissive path
on the railroad right of way if struck by a projection from
the train.
Justice Brandeis speaking for the majority of the Court
did not confine the decision to reinterpretation of the 34th
Section of the Judiciary Act.4  Justice Reed, concurring in
part, counseled this position but the majority view found
in the case an issue of constitutionality.
Justice Story had said in Swift v. Tyson,5
"In order to maintain the argument, it is essential, therefore, to hold,
that the word 'laws', in this section, includes within the scope of its
meaning, the decisions of the local tribunals. In the ordinary use of
language, it will hardly be contended, that the decisions of courts con-
stitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are,
and are not, of themselves, laws. They are often re-examined, reversed
and qualified by the courts themselves, whenever they are found to be
4 The fact that the interpretation of the 34th Section of the Judiciary Act
had been consistently followed by the Courts and the legislation reenacted
after such construction became fixed justified the Court to seek other grounds
for its opinion.
5 16 Pet. (41 U. S.) 1 at 17-18.
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either defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect. The laws of a
state are more usually understood to mean the rules and enactments
promulgated by the legislative authority thereof, or long-established
local customs having the force of laws. In all the various, cases, which
have hitherto come before us for decision, this court has uniformly
supposed, that the true interpretation of the 34th section limited its
application to state laws, strictly local, that is to say, to the positive
statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local
tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality,
such as the rights and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable
and intra-territorial in their nature and character. It never has been
supposed by us, that the section did apply, or was designed to apply,
to questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent upon local
statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation, as, for
example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written
instruments, and especially to questions of general commercial law
where the state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions
as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon geheral reasoning and legal
analogies, what is the true exposition of the contract or instrument,
or what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law
to govern the case."
Justice Brandeis concludes that the view as expressed was
erroneous and relies largely upon the research of Mr. Charles
Warren.6 In his work Mr. Warren shows that as originally
drafted the section in question was as follows:
"And be it further enacted, That the statute law of the several
states in force for the time being and their unwritten or common law
now in use, whether by adoption from the common law of England,
the ancient statutes of the same or otherwise, except where the constitu-
tion, Treaties or Statutes of the United States shall otherwise require
or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decisions in the trials at common
law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply;"
That the draftsman changed the phraseology of the sec-
tion by striking out "statute law" and inserting in their place
the word "laws" and then struck out the words:
"in force for the time being and their unwritten or common law now
in use, whether by adoption from the common law of England, the
ancient statutes of the same or otherwise ;"
6 Warren's-"New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789" (1923), 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49.
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with the result that the same thought was expressed in more
concise form.7
But the real significance of the majority- opinion is ex-
pressed by Justice Brandeis:
"The Federal Courts assumed in the broad field of 'general law'
the power to declare rules of decision which Congress was confessedly
without power to enact as statutes" .
"But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been
made clear, and compels us to do so."
"Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts
of Congress, the law -to be applied in any case is the law of the state.
And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a
statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state
whether they be local in their nature or 'general', be they commercial
law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution
purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts."
It is clear that Justice Story had proceeded upon the
assumption that Congress had the power to declare the sub-
stantive rules applicable in litigation in Federal Courts even
though they were not authorized by some other express or
implied grant of power in the Federal Constitution. The
reasonable implication from the Erie Railroad case is the
denial of that power whether the law is expressed by the
Congress or the courts and further it is clear that such power
is one reserved to the states. It is strongly suggested that the
decision has a definite bearing upon the subject of the powers
of the federal government and those of the states.9
Justice Story expressed the prevailing theory of jurispru-
dence of the day that judicial decisions were not law in them-
selves but were merely evidence of law. The fallacy of this
position is ably discussed by Justice Holmes.
7 It was argued before justice Story that if anything broader than statutes
was intended by the word "laws" the draftsman would have used the phrase
"system of laws."
8 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 819,, 822.
9 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1312.
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"Books written about any branch of the common law treat it as a
unit, cite cases from this court, from the circuit courts of appeal, from
the state courts, from England and the Colonies of England indiscrimi-
nately, and criticise them as right or wrong according to the writer's
notions of a single theory. It is very hard to resist the impression that
there is one august corpus, to understand which clearly is the only
task of any court concerned. If there were such a transcendental body
of law outside of any particular state but obligatory within it unless
and until changed by statute, the courts of the United States might be
right in using their independent judgment as to what it was. But
there is no such body of law. The fallacy and illusion that I think
exist consist in supposing that there is this outside thing to be found.
Law is a word used with different meanings, but law in the sense
in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite
authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a state,
whether called common law or not, is not the common law generally
but the law of that state existing by the authority of that state
without regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere
else."l 0
The only real justification for the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson is clearly untenable under modern theories of juris-
prudence. The abuses which arose from the doctrine" and
its failure to achieve uniformity in the law contributed to
the view of the Court in the Erie Railroad case. 12  But its
real significance to the writer is the limitation upon Congress
and the Federal Courts which is expressed and the possible
future employment by the Court of the language of Justice
Brandeis wherein he states that the interpretation persisted
in by the Supreme Court constituted an unconstitutional exer-
cise of power by that Court.
10 Holmes, J., dissenting in Black and White Taxi Cab & Transfer Co. v.
Brown and Yellow Taxi Cab and Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518 at 533, 48 S. Ct.
404, 57 A. L. R. 426.
11 See Black and White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow
Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518.
12 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 58 S. Ct. 817 (821). It was suggested that the
prestige of the Supreme Court of the United States would encourage state courts
to follow its decisions upon matters of general law and thus uniformity would
be achieved. But obviously this has not been the case.
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